Spinoza’s Place in Twentieth Century Anglo-American Philosophy

J. Thomas Cook*

Abstract
This paper began as an address at the 100th anniversary celebration of the Vereniging het Spinozahuis in Amsterdam in 1997. I trace the highlights of Spinoza reception and scholarship in the Anglo-American philosophical community from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century. Beginning with the British Idealists’ enthusiasm for Spinoza as a systematic metaphysician, I move through the indifference of the (anti-metaphysical) positivists to the renewal of interest among more naturalistically-minded analytical philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century. Along the way there are brief discussions of a few individual thinkers who engaged with Spinoza in especially interesting or influential ways, such as Caird, Santayana, Russell, Wolfson, Hampshire, and Curley.

Keywords: Spinoza, Spinoza reception, British Idealism, Santayana, Russell, Hampshire, Curley

1 A Modest Beginning

The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza contains a fine essay by Pierre-Francois Moreau on Spinoza’s reception and on his influence during the more than three hundred years that have passed since his death.1 In Moreau’s twenty-five page article we find a brief paragraph on the novelist George Eliot and half a sentence on Edwin M. Curley. There is not another mention, at all, of any other philosopher from an English-speaking country since the seventeenth century, nothing on how Spinoza’s ideas were received in England, North America or Australia—not a word on any influence that Spinoza might have had on later thinkers in those countries.

Probably the best single-volume history of Anglo-American philosophy covering the first half of the twentieth century is John Passmore’s *A Hundred Years of Philosophy.* The six hundred pages of this book provide a thoroughgoing review of the main currents and the smaller eddies, the great luminaries and the lesser lights of philosophy in English-speaking countries during that period. Yet the sum total of all discussion (or even mention) of Spinoza in those six hundred pages comprises fewer than eight lines of text.

I mention these works not in order to complain that Moreau and Passmore have somehow fallen down on the job. On the contrary, I think that basically they have read the situation accurately. These textual statistics remind us that for the last three centuries Spinoza has not been at the center of philosophical attention in English-speaking countries. Nor have English-speaking countries been the leading centers of Spinoza research, scholarship and commentary.

Though Spinoza’s role in the twentieth century’s Anglo-American philosophy has been a relatively modest one, there is an interesting story to tell about it. Spinoza says that Paul’s idea of Peter reflects the condition of Paul’s own body more than the nature of Peter. So too, the story of Anglo-American Spinoza scholarship may tell us more about the condition of Anglo-American philosophy than about the nature of Spinoza. But the story will serve as a reminder of the depth of Spinoza’s thought and of the way in which his ideas can engage the attention of philosophers of very different orientations.

Stuart Hampshire, a member of the *Vereniging Het Spinozahuis* and one of the figures discussed below, made the following statement to the British Academy in 1960:

> When the study of Spinoza is viewed historically, one sees that each commentator, unconsciously faithful to his own age and to his own philosophical culture, has seized upon some one element in Spinoza’s thought; he then proceeds to develop the whole of the philosophy from this single center.

My brief account of Spinoza’s place in this century’s Anglo-American philosophy will, on a small scale, provide evidence in support of Hampshire’s claim. The hundred years since the founding of the *Vereniging* have seen a number of changes in “philosophical culture” in the English-speaking world, and the direction of Spinoza scholarship has often reflected those changes. Not only has the conceptual focus of the commentators often been responsive to the philosophical culture of the age, but the amount and intensity of scholarly work on Spinoza has likewise varied with the changing winds of philosophical convention. To a great extent, then, to talk about developments in Spinoza-studies is necessarily to talk about developments in Anglo-American philosophy as a whole during this period.

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that Spinoza can attract the attention of scholars and students only insofar as his ideas happen to resonate with the concerns that are philosophically fashionable at a specific time and place. Spinoza is sufficiently intriguing as a thinker and as an

---

historical figure that he can engage the interest of the historian of philosophy in any age. And there is a timeless dimension to Spinoza’s thought that allows it to reach across the centuries to speak directly to the philosophically disquieted soul of any age and land.

In tracing the place of Spinoza’s thought in this past century’s Anglo-American philosophy, we will find an ebb and flow in the tide of scholarly activity and wide variation in the motives that brought different thinkers into dialogue with him. We will find philosophers such as Caird, Joachim, Hampshire and Matson enlisting Spinoza as an ally as they wrestle with issues that seem salient and central because of the philosophical context of their day. We will find historians of a purist sort such as Wolfson and Popkin. And we will find philosophers such as Santayana and Russell who did not focus their own work on Spinoza but who found in certain of his ideas the promise of an answer to a philosophical question of a more personal or individual kind.

2 The Late Nineteenth Century

A hundred years ago, when the Vereniging Het Spinozahuis was being organized in 1897, Spinoza’s star seemed to be on the rise in the English-speaking world. The general philosophical ambience seemed right for a flowering of interest in Spinoza’s system. From St. Louis and Boston to Oxford and Glasgow, with Royce, Bradley and the Scottish Hegelians, the waning decades of the nineteenth century were rich in speculative philosophy of a systematic kind. And, as had been the case with Hegel himself, a number of these philosophers looked upon Spinoza as an important and worthy predecessor. There was a cauldron of idealisms on both sides of the Atlantic, a rich brew of metaphysical speculation that provided fertile ground for a growing interest in Spinoza.

In 1880 Frederick Pollock published a solid and serious study entitled *Spinoza: His Life and Works*. 4 This was immediately followed by James Martineau’s book-length work. 5 In 1884 the first nearly complete translation of Spinoza’s works into English was accomplished by R. H. M. Elwes. 6

In 1888 John Caird published a volume on Spinoza in the Blackwood series of *Philosophical Classics for English Readers*. 7

Let me interrupt this chronology to look more closely at Caird’s book for a moment, for it seems to me illustrative of the atmosphere within which this remarkable flurry of Spinoza-oriented scholarship was taking place. John Caird was the brother of the better-known Edward Caird, a noted Scottish Hegelian who taught in Glasgow and at Oxford and who contributed the volume on Hegel to the same Blackwood Classics series. 8 John Caird, in discussing Spinoza’s philosophy, focuses on the deepest tensions of the system—between the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, the one and the many—and explains that these elemental tensions remain hopelessly irreconcilable for Spinoza since he lacks the Hegelian conceptuality needed to provide the reconciliation. “[T]hough Spinoza’s philosophy cannot, in the form in which he presents it, be freed from inconsistency, yet

---

much of that inconsistency is due to the limitations of an imperfect logic […] the philosophy of a later time has taught us how it is possible to embrace in one system ideas which in him seem to be antagonistic.”

And later, “[W]hat Spinoza was feeling after through all these contradictory expressions, is to be found in the conception of God as Absolute Spirit.”

On Caird’s reading, Spinoza was on the right track, but was hampered by his non-dialectical method, hamstrung by his lack of the basic Hegelian insight that substance must become subject. Caird’s view is pretty typical in this regard and the quoted passages give a sense for the philosophical milieu within which these Spinoza scholars were writing in the 1880s.

The 1890s saw active British Spinoza scholarship as well, though not quite on the scale that we saw in the 1880s. New translations of the *Ethics* and the *TIE* were prepared by Hale White and Amelia Sterling in 1894 and 1895, and as the decade and century drew to a close, Harold H. Joachim was putting the final touches on his own book entitled *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*. Joachim (whose fine commentary on the *TIE* was published years later in 1940, after his death) was a popular and respected teacher at Oxford who carried the banner of British Idealism into the twentieth century. His study of the *Ethics* remains one of the best in the English language, memorable for its unwavering argumentative insistence that for Spinoza individuality is ultimately illusory, and that Spinoza cannot make the fact of the illusion intelligible since his account of the illusion requires reference to the very individuality whose status is in question.

As this chronology indicates, Spinoza received a great deal of attention in Britain in the late nineteenth century. This attention mostly came from the idealists who found many of his views congenial to their own way of thinking. These philosophers were attracted by Spinoza’s monism, by his emphasis on the interrelatedness and interdependence of all things, and by his view that an adequate understanding of any individual finite thing requires an understanding of the whole of Nature. These are of course central tenets of Spinoza’s theory, and the British Idealists were right in seeing a certain affinity between these Spinozistic doctrines and their own views. But other elements of his system were downplayed, and as Spinoza came to be identified with those doctrines of most interest to the idealists, his own standing was tied to the fortunes of those idealist admirers. During the eighties and nineties, this was a source of strength, but the twentieth century brought new directions of thought in the Anglo-American world, displacing idealism from its position of preeminence in the British academy. These new developments created an atmosphere less conducive to Spinoza studies and less hospitable to Spinozistic ideas.

---

The First Half of the Twentieth Century

The turn of the century brought active resistance to idealism on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1903 G. E. Moore delivered his call to arms in an essay entitled “The Refutation of Idealism” just as William James was adapting Peircean principles to found Pragmatism in the United States. Both “common sense realism” and American pragmatism were, in different ways, hostile to the systematic aspirations of the idealists. In a few short years, the tide of battle turned and the direction of Anglo-American philosophy changed (seemingly) forever. In addition to the movements inspired directly by James and Moore, other new schools such as logical atomism and logical positivism emphasized their affinities with classical British empiricism, thereby distancing themselves from what they saw as the excesses of Continental speculation. Neither these schools nor the various programs of language analysis that arose a little later paid much attention to Spinoza. Pragmatism, empiricism and language analysis did not provide fertile ground for the growth of Spinoza studies. Gone were the days of the late nineteenth century in which the dominant school of philosophy in the English-speaking world cultivated an intense interest in our philosopher.

Yet even in this rather hostile environment, Spinoza had supporters. And individual philosophers continued to be influenced by Spinoza even if they did not focus their professional writing on his thought. Two of these individual thinkers deserve special consideration, for they were important figures in their own right and were, each in his own way, deeply affected by certain tenets of Spinozism. I have in mind George Santayana and Bertrand Russell.

Santayana is an enigmatic figure in American letters. Born in Avila, Spain (and a lifelong Spanish citizen), he grew up in Boston, studied at Harvard and for twenty years served as professor at that institution. But he spent every free moment that he could in Europe and in 1912, before he turned fifty, he retired from Harvard and moved permanently back to the Old World. He lived in England for a while, and then Paris, before settling finally in Rome. Santayana’s Latin Catholic heritage and his critically distant perspective on the United States make one hesitate to call him an American philosopher—though no other nationally-defined category would be appropriate either. He wrote in English, and that fact may be considered decisive in defining his identity, for his life was above all that of a writer. Santayana wrote prolifically and was one of those rare philosophers who wrote beautifully and powerfully. In truth, he may be remembered in the long run more for his poetic prowess than for his analytical acuity.

In one of his autobiographical reports of his undergraduate years at Harvard, Santayana says, “I will not attempt to describe here the many lessons that I learned in the study of Spinoza, lessons that in several respects laid the foundation of my philosophy. I will only say that I learned [these lessons] from Spinoza himself, from his ipsissima verba, studied in the original in all the crucial passages.”¹⁴ Santayana’s first published work was an article on Spinoza’s ethical doctrine which appeared in the *Harvard Monthly*, written when he was twenty-two years old.¹⁵ His affinity and


respect for Spinoza were well-known, as attested by the fact that he was asked to provide the
Introduction to the Everyman’s edition of the Ethics and was invited to address the commemorative
meeting of the Societas Spinozana in the Hague in 1932 upon the 300th anniversary of Spinoza’s
birth. 16

Santayana is rightly classified as a naturalist (though he actually called himself a materialist).
He was opposed to “egotistical German idealisms” for (as he read them) these idealisms illegitimately
project human values onto material reality and wrongly take nature to be a product of the mind rather
than the mind a product of nature. In these fundamental naturalistic positions he took himself to be
in agreement with Spinoza, but he felt himself most indebted to Spinoza in the matter of ethics and
the source of values. Santayana repeatedly reminds his readers of the Spinozistic adage that “we do
not desire anything because we judge it to be good, but rather we judge something to be good […]
because we desire it” (E3p9s). He credits Spinoza with having taught him that “[m]orality is something
natural. It arises and varies, not only psychologically but prescriptively and justly, with the nature
of the creature whose morality it is.”17 Santayana recognized that this sort of ethical doctrine is
difficult for people to accept:

After all, it is a great sacrifice that Spinoza asks us to make when he would have us
confess that our approvals and disapprovals are nothing but personal equations; or, at
most, indications of the needs and interests of the human race. Somehow it gives a man
a sense of dignity and self-satisfaction to believe that his interests are those of the
universe, and his likes and dislikes those of God; but this faith Spinoza would have us
abandon. A doctrine which bids us lay down our lives and gives us, meantime, the
assurance that our cause is absolutely just and our adversary’s cause absolutely unjust,
demands a smaller sacrifice than a doctrine that bids us keep our lives and give up that
assurance.18

Even though Santayana credits Spinoza with having taught him the basic principle of the relativity
of values, he criticizes his teacher in this matter for having abandoned that basic position in part four
of the Ethics. As Santayana sees it, Spinoza has made the case that what is good for an individual
is that which is conducive to that individual’s perseverance in being. But at a crucial juncture, Spinoza
identifies the individual organism’s endeavor to persevere in being with the mind’s endeavor to
achieve understanding through acquiring adequate ideas. Santayana objects to this move on Spinoza’s
part, for he sees it as either inconsistent with the basic principle of the relativity of value or insensitive
to the great variety of human nature, character and temperament. Some people do indeed find the
greatest expression, fulfillment and preservation of their individual natures in a life focused upon

16 George Santayana, “Introduction” to Everyman Edition of Spinoza’s Ethics and De Intellectus Emendatione (New
York: E. P. Dutton, 1910); George Santayana, “Ultimate Religion,” Septimana Spinozana; Acta Conventus
Oecumenici in Memoriam Benedicti de Spinoza Diei Natalis Trecentesimi Hagae Comitibus; Curis Societatis
17 Santayana, Persons, 234.
18 Santayana, The Idler, 76.
adequate understanding, but such people are relatively rare, and to suggest that their good is “the good for man,” as Spinoza seems to do, is illegitimate.

Though Santayana staunchly defended the validity of the desires and the goods of “the soldier, the poet, the prince and the lover” against Spinoza’s hegemonic claims for the primacy of the understanding, he of course personally shared with Spinoza the sort of individual character which does indeed find its fulfillment and preservation in the life of the mind. Though he did not entirely share Spinoza’s engaged enthusiasm for the science of his (respective) day, and though he was more interested in contemplating timeless essences than in understanding how these essences follow necessarily from the lawlike regularities of nature, Santayana was at one with Spinoza on the *vera acquiescentia animi* to be found in seeing oneself and all things *sub specie aeternitatis*. Such a timeless apprehension of essences is definitive of what Santayana called “the spiritual life”—a phrase that has come to epitomize one of the best-known and most memorable aspects of Santayana’s philosophy.

Bertrand Russell is highly regarded by professional philosophers for the brilliance and technical virtuosity of his early works in logic and mathematics. He was also for many years a prolific critic and essayist, addressing popular questions of morality, education and politics. In the latter capacity he enjoyed a very wide readership and was at the center of extensive controversy.

It is worth remembering that Spinoza and Russell shared not only ideas, but also the experience of public calumny and condemnation at the hands of a hostile community. Russell was sharply criticized and assailed by an angry mob for his pacifism, jailed for making critical remarks about the United States, shunned by his socialist friends for criticizing the Soviet Union and publicly vilified in the United States as “Professor of Indecency” for his views on sex and marriage. In all this public condemnation, he felt a sense of kinship with Spinoza and admired the serenity and equanimity with which the outcast Jew dealt with rejection by his community.

But pariah-status is not all that these two philosophers had in common. As Kenneth Blackwell has shown in convincing detail, Russell’s ethical views were deeply influenced by his repeated reading of Spinoza’s works at different times throughout his long life. In 1911 he wrote of his affinity for Spinoza in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell:

> Ever since I first read Pollock’s book, which was when I was an undergraduate, Spinoza has been one of the most important people in my world. But I find that his importance grows greater and greater to me—all my own thought makes me understand him better, and see the things he is meaning to say more clearly and with more knowledge of their importance […]. What I want to say is extraordinarily like what he says.  

When Russell speaks here of “what I want to say,” he is not referring to metaphysics or logic, but to his views on ethics. In fact, Russell was working on a book on ethics at the time this letter was written.

When Russell began formal study at Cambridge in 1893, he came under the influence of British Idealism, and thus he inherited the idealists’ interest in and high regard for Spinoza as a worthy

---

predecessor of Absolute Idealism. Russell soon left Bradley’s system behind, and as the decades passed, whatever sympathy he might have had for the details of Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics was left behind as well. But certain aspects of Spinoza’s ethical views, as presented in parts three, four, and five of the Ethics, continued to engage and influence Russell for the rest of his nearly century-long life. As examples let us consider briefly his belief in the importance of gaining a causal-scientific understanding of the passions (one’s own and others’) and his appropriation of Spinoza’s doctrine of the intellectual love of God.

From his earliest reading of the Ethics, Russell was convinced that the more we understand others’ motives and actions as following necessarily in the course of nature, the more we will be able to control our own negative passionate responses to those actions. He also held (with Spinoza) that understanding ourselves and others in terms of causal factors beyond ourselves leads to a broadening of our perspective. To understand things in their larger context is, in a sense, to escape from the narrow bounds of one’s individual skin. Blackwell refers to this as “impersonal self-enlargement” and ties it to Russell’s appropriation of Spinoza’s amor dei intellectualis.

There is room for debate over the extent to which Russell’s normative ideal is consonant with Spinoza’s actual views, but it is plausible to see Russell as developing his own position in dialogue with Spinoza. Russell rejected those aspects of Spinoza’s ideal that were inseparable from the latter’s conception of God. He rejected the view that evil things would lose their evil character when adequately known as they are in God. Having rejected Spinoza’s system, he was hard-pressed to explain how understanding—even of horrible things—is to yield joy in the act of understanding. Yet he maintained to the end that he and Spinoza shared similar visions of the ultimate human good in the loss of one’s narrow self in the timeless knowledge and contemplation of the whole.

In talking about the first half of this century, I have paid attention to Santayana and Russell as philosophers of some significance in their own right who were influenced in important ways by Spinoza. I have not focused upon those scholars for whom Spinoza was a central thematic focus, for in truth this was not a period of great overall productivity in this regard. In the 1930s and 40s especially, philosophical discussion in English-speaking countries was preoccupied with positivism. This tendency was strengthened by A. J. Ayer’s popular defense of the verifiability principle (Language, Truth and Logic) and by the arrival in the United States of a number of influential German-speaking (mostly Austrian) philosophers in flight from the Nazis.21 Rightly or wrongly, the positivists tended to see Spinoza as a metaphysician of the sort whose claims were neither analytic nor verifiable, and hence fit only for the flames of Hume’s bonfire of metaphysical vanities. It was not an atmosphere conducive to Spinoza studies.

Despite the inauspicious conditions, three scholars produced works during these decades that were exceptional and deserve special mention here. First, Harry Austryn Wolfson published a series of articles beginning in the early 1920s (many of which first appeared in the Chronicon Spinozanum) which were later elaborated and amplified into a work of more than 700 pages published in 1934 under the title The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning.22 In

---

the Introduction to the work, Wolfson explains his approach in words that are often quoted in the literature:

In the case of the Ethics of Spinoza, there is, on the one hand, an explicit Spinoza, whom we shall call Benedictus. It is he who speaks in definitions, axioms and propositions; it is he, too, who reasons according to the rigid method of the geometer. Then there is on the other hand the implicit Spinoza, who lurks behind these definitions, axioms and propositions, only occasionally revealing himself in the scholia; his mind is crammed with traditional philosophical lore and his thought turns along the beaten paths of medieval reasoning. Him we shall call Baruch. Benedictus is the first of the moderns; Baruch is the last of the medievals.

Wolfson sets out to reconstruct what he calls a hypothetical Ethica More Scholastico Rabbinicoque Demonstrata in light of which he seeks to interpret the published Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. The result is an intellectual-historical tour de force in which Wolfson surveys sources (familiar and obscure) in Latin, Greek, Hebrew and Arabic, reconstructing what he thinks must have been the conceptual contours of the philosophical problematic as it presented itself to Spinoza.

Wolfson’s work is now a classic. It is interesting to note, however, that it has not had the kind of influence on subsequent commentators that one might expect. While everyone commends the learned scholarship, almost no one accepts much of the interpretation itself. One hears of the “overwhelming erudition” and the “awesome learning” but among English-speaking commentators one finds little sympathy or support for the substantive interpretive claims based on that awesome learning.24 I suspect that this is in part because the last medieval (Baruch) seems out of touch with philosophical questions and issues of current interest. Or perhaps it’s that Wolfson’s Spinoza seems to have less of a claim to originality. In any case, Wolfson’s approach to Spinoza certainly was original in its day, and it is significant, I think, that a scholar of Wolfson’s stature (he was Professor of Hebrew Literature and Philosophy at Harvard) undertook to place Spinoza’s thought in the intellectual context of the Jewish community within which he grew up and first confronted philosophical issues.

The other author from this period whose work warrants special mention published three books and a number of influential articles on Spinoza over a period of thirty-two years. The first of these appeared in 1930 under the title Aeternitas: A Spinozistic Study.25 Its author, H. F. Hallett, Professor at the University of London, undertook a full-scale interpretation and defense of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Twenty-five years later, 1957 saw the publication of a more general introduction of Spinoza’s works followed, in 1962, by another more substantive work entitled Creation, Emanation and Salvation: A Spinozistic Study.26 In each of these works Hallett does battle with the opponents

23 Wolfson, Philosophy of Spinoza, vii.
of metaphysics, whom he invariably describes as having been misled by a “truncated empiricism.” He defends the traditional metaphysical enterprise by arguing that Spinoza’s system can do just what Spinoza says it can—provide for the possibility of salvation and eternal life through adequate understanding of oneself as a part of *Deus sive natura*.

Hallett is, I think, one of the most insightful English-language Spinoza commentators. Unfortunately, he has had relatively little influence, even in the English-speaking world, for his exposition of his interpretive ideas is extremely difficult. Unsatisfied with the available philosophical vocabulary (in English or in Latin) Hallett creates new terminology and uses it in dauntingly difficult sentence-constructions. The result, alas, is an idiom that is often more opaque than the Spinozistic passages that it is supposed to clarify.

At mid-century another British scholar joined Hallett in opposing the dominant positivistic and empiricist spirit of the age. Ruth Saw, Professor at Bedford College, was best known for her extensive work in aesthetics and her founding role in the British Society for Aesthetics. But she had an abiding interest in the systematic metaphysics of Spinoza and Leibniz as well, and published a substantial work entitled *The Vindication of Metaphysics: A Study in the Philosophy of Spinoza*.27 This is a serious and insightful study, but it garnered little attention in the hostile philosophical environment of its time.

4 After Mid-Century

In Anglo-American countries, despite the individual luminaries whom we have mentioned, the first half of the twentieth century was a relatively dark time for Spinoza studies. The real revival of interest in our philosopher began, I think, mid-century. If we need to fix a specific date, I suggest 1951, the publication year of Stuart Hampshire’s Penguin Paperback introduction to Spinoza.28 Still in print in 2024 this work has gone through several revisions and numerous printings, achieving something akin to philosophical bestseller status. (When I first studied Spinoza in 1970, Hampshire’s work was the only readily available, accessible secondary work that could be recommended to an interested undergraduate). But more important than its wide circulation were the tone and the approach of the work.

In Hampshire’s work we find little of Wolfson’s heavy historicism and none of Hallett’s tortured neologisms. On the contrary, Spinoza is presented in terms that emphasize the familiarity of the questions that motivated him and the accessibility to us of the answers that he offered. Hampshire highlights the *natura* side of *Deus sive natura* and never misses an opportunity to point out ways in which Spinoza’s account of extension and of organism prefigured later discoveries in the natural sciences. Hampshire’s Spinoza is not looking back to his rabbinc or scholastic predecessors; he is looking ahead, helping to lay the conceptual foundations for the new natural philosophy of his time.

Writing in Oxford at mid-century, Hampshire could not ignore the likely indictment of much of Spinoza’s theory as unverifiable and meaningless metaphysical verbiage. Hampshire had to defend Spinoza against such charges. His defense took various forms, but his most effective response, I think, is found in the following passage:

to many twentieth-century philosophers the construction of metaphysical systems of any kind has come to seem finally useless and impossible; some philosophers are even prepared to dismiss all deductive metaphysics of the type of Spinoza’s as senseless, on the ground that only by careful experiment and observation can anything be learnt of the actual structure of the universe […]. We no longer have any need of armchair programmes of science; contemporary philosophers are in effect proclaiming this fact when they denounce all metaphysical systems as useless and misleading. But speculation of a kind that may be absurd and useless at one stage of the development of our knowledge may be significant and useful at another; associated with the beginning of experimental physics it is natural to find philosophical speculation about the ultimate nature of matter; associated with the beginnings of experimental psychology, it is natural to find philosophical speculation about the powers and faculties of the mind.  

Thus, Hampshire aligns Spinoza’s speculation with the more fluid early phases of natural science, disarming the scientifically-minded opponents of speculative metaphysics. It is an effective way to avoid alienating the empiricists, and it is not, I think, entirely wrongheaded. 

But Hampshire did a lot more to promote interest in Spinoza in the ensuing years. Hampshire was a well-known and very well-respected philosopher, especially after the publication of his 1959 work Thought and Action. His reputation was strong on both sides of the Atlantic, as evidenced by the fact that he served as Professor at University College London, at Princeton, at Oxford and finally at Stanford. He was in a position to give a number of high-visibility lectures on subjects of his own choosing, and he very often used those occasions to showcase his conviction that Spinoza had something important to communicate to the science-oriented twentieth century. For example, in 1960 he spoke at the British Academy, choosing as his topic “Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom,” and announced in his opening remarks “I have the persisting feeling […] that in the philosophy of mind [Spinoza] is nearer to the truth at certain points than any other philosopher ever has been.”

Arriving in the United States in 1963, he was already in 1969 giving the Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association on Spinoza. Entitled “A Kind of Materialism,” this lecture argued that Spinoza had understood better than anyone else what it would be like actually to be a materialist, in the serious sense: not simply of affirming an abstract thesis in the classroom, but of actually living and acting with some of the specific knowledge that a materialist claims must be obtainable. What would it

---

29 Hampshire, Spinoza, 211.
be like to apply this exact knowledge, once obtained, to oneself, every day, in forming one’s own attitudes, sentiments and purposes?\

Finally, when invited in 1976 to give a series of lectures supported by the Thank Offering to Britain Fund, Hampshire chose to compare and contrast the ethical doctrines of Aristotle and Spinoza: Aristotle, the descriptive theorist; Spinoza, the revisionary. In the end, if in a guarded way, Hampshire comes down in favor of Spinoza.

These essays were published and these lectures delivered at a time when Anglo-American philosophy was, in the main, deeply concerned with (some would say obsessed with) the philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Focusing on Spinoza’s naturalism and emphasizing his historical position in the early stages of the scientific revolution, Hampshire produced an easy confluence of his Spinoza and the philosophical mainstream of his day.

I say “his” Spinoza, but I do not mean to suggest that Hampshire hopelessly distorted Spinoza’s views by calling him “A Kind of Materialist” and by enlisting him as an ally in addressing contemporary questions. Spinoza was of course not a materialist, but he often gave a kind of explanatory priority to the attribute of extension. The important point is that Spinoza thought seriously about what it would mean to us to be able to understand ourselves by reference to material causes, and that is a question of great interest to many Anglo-American philosophers today.

Spinoza was one of history’s most emphatic determinists, and yet the chief normative distinction in his system is the distinction between free and un­free. His conception of causal necessity is different from contemporary conceptions; his reasons for being a determinist may no longer convince us—but the question of how to sustain a meaningful distinction between free and un­free in a world of universal natural causation is a question of great concern to many contemporary Anglo­American philosophers.

No doubt there is some anachronism and distortion involved in Hampshire’s reading Spinoza in this way. But it had the effect, I think, of repositioning Spinoza in the collective mental geography of the Anglo-American philosophical community—and it was this repositioning which, I think, sparked the revival of interest in Spinoza that I am exploring in this essay.

Of course, this repositioning was not the work of Stuart Hampshire alone. Another important figure whose contribution must be mentioned is Edwin M. Curley. Curley’s doctoral dissertation, published in 1969, offered a detailed analysis of the two orders of causation in Spinoza (“vertical” and “horizontal” as they have come to be called), and provided an interpretation of divine causation of finite modes that matches very neatly with the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation that was widely accepted at the time. This work, too, helped to establish Spinoza’s *bona fides* as an historical figure of importance and interest to philosophers of a natural-scientific bent.


33 Stuart Hampshire, Two Theories of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). These lectures were originally delivered as the Thank Offering to Britain Fund Lectures in 1976.

One further factor was of great importance, I think, in the repositioning of Spinoza that has led to the impressive revival of interest. During the second half of the twentieth century much of Anglo-American philosophy was fixated upon issues in the philosophy of mind. Old-time dualism had lost its appeal, materialists such as Hobbes and de la Mettrie seemed hopelessly naïve, and the search was on for a more plausible and defensible understanding of the relationship between mind and brain, the mental and the physical. In such an atmosphere Spinoza naturally attracts attention, for his identity theory is unusual and intriguing. In the journal literature I count over twenty articles between 1975 and 1995 in which the author uses concepts, categories and distinctions from contemporary philosophy of mind in trying to elucidate Spinoza’s views.

In truth, the Spinoza interpretation that emerges from this repositioning (as I am calling it) is not a balanced interpretation. On the contrary, it is a tendentious and in some ways anachronistic version of Spinoza’s thought. But, as I say, it attracted the attention of a number of scholars and is in great part responsible for the revival of interest in Spinoza in English-speaking countries in the second half of the twentieth century. Fortunately, there seems to be a kind of self-correcting mechanism that comes into play with such tendentious interpretations. One is led by one’s own contemporary philosophical concerns to examine some narrow aspect of Spinoza’s views from some possibly oblique perspective. But in the process of developing and defending one’s position, one is drawn in by the remarkable unity of the *Ethics*, until in the end one finds oneself engaged by the system as a whole, intrigued by the details and interested in the historical context in which it arose.

There are a number of individual thinkers whom might be mentioned as examples of this tendency, but again the most important is Curley. Having begun with an attempt to read Spinoza as a kind of logical atomist, Curley was drawn into the ideas, into the historical period and into the text itself—so much so that he undertook, as something of a life’s project, a translation of Spinoza’s complete works for the Princeton University Press.\(^{35}\) When he began this project, there existed no English translation of Spinoza’s chief works based on the Gebhardt critical edition, and the last (nearly) full translation was the previously mentioned version by Elwes, published in 1884.\(^{36}\) Curley’s project of translation was one of the early fruits of the revival of interest in Spinoza in Anglo-American philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. And that translation has itself been a fertile catalyst for even more productive scholarship. Curley himself has written a series of papers and monographs over the years, and the trend in these papers has been toward greater and greater historical detail and sensitivity to the seventeenth-century context within which Spinoza was writing. In addition, Curley supported Spinoza scholarship by generously making early pre-publication drafts of his translations widely available to interested scholars.

Anglo-American Spinoza scholarship was flourishing at the end of the twentieth century as it never had in the past. The last fifteen years have seen the publication of half a dozen good, solid book-length commentaries on all or part of the *Ethics*. The most controversial and widely discussed of these is from Jonathan Bennett, whose resolute lack of reverence and lack of interest in the details

---

of historical context have ruffled the feathers of some. But it is widely agreed that Bennett’s book is impressive in its analytical insight and has stimulated a lot of productive argument and discussion. Other recent commentaries include Curley’s *Behind the Geometrical Method*, Alan Donagan’s *Spinoza*, Henry Allison’s *Spinoza: an Introduction*, and Genevieve Lloyd’s *Part of Nature*. More specialized studies that have appeared in the century’s last decade include Michael Della Rocca’s *Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza* and Richard Mason’s *The God of Spinoza*. The literature is proliferating and (I venture to say) our understanding of Spinoza’s thought is advancing.

It is noteworthy that I have said nothing about Spinoza’s political thought, nor indeed about the *TTP* at all. This is because until just recently there was relatively little discussion of the political theory among Anglo-American philosophers. My generalization about the *TTP* has one important exception: Leo Strauss, a German immigrant to the United States who was Professor at the University of Chicago, wrote a well-known controversial article in which he argued that Spinoza’s straightforward claims regarding philosophy and theology should not be taken seriously, but that the rules Spinoza provides for interpretation of scripture can be turned upon the *TTP* itself to reveal Spinoza’s real (esoteric) doctrines that he dared not express openly for fear of persecution. The best-known response to Strauss (in the English-speaking world) came from Errol Harris in 1978 and was published in the *Mededelingen* series.

Very recently, in the 1990’s, there has been a dramatic increase in Anglo-American scholarly attention to the *TTP*. Young commentators are turning their attention toward that “neglected masterpiece,” works by Continental scholars are being translated into English and an anthology of recent work by American scholars appears in 1999. This flurry of interest in the *TTP* can be attributed in part to Curley and in part to the work of Continental thinkers (especially French and Italian). But a large part of the credit must also be given to Richard Popkin who first addressed Spinoza’s views on scripture in his well-known book on skepticism, and who has, in the eighties and early nineties, produced a fascinating series of articles on the complex and colorful religious and scriptural-interpretive milieu within which Spinoza lived and worked.

---

37 Bennett, *Spinoza’s Ethics*.
On the whole, Anglo-American Spinoza scholarship is indeed flourishing at the end of the twentieth century. One additional indicator of this flourishing can be found in the fact that (so far as I know for the first time) there is a professional society of Spinoza scholars in an English-speaking country. The North American Spinoza Society, founded in 1992, boasted almost ninety members in 1997, publishes occasional monographs and meets now and then (together with the American Philosophical Association) for discussions and presentation of papers. (The Society is still active, under a new generation of leadership, in 2024.) One final statistic might be helpful in establishing the extent to which Anglo-American Spinoza scholarship is prospering at the end of the twentieth century. Mr. Theo van der Werf, Secretarius of the Vereniging was good enough to go back into the archives of the organization to count the number of Vereniging members from Anglo-American countries over the years. In 1921 there were a total of four members of the Vereniging from Great Britain, Australia or the United States. In 1958 there were three. By contrast, Mr. Van der Werf tells me that in 1997 there are more than fifty Spinoza scholars from Anglo-American countries who are registered members of the Vereniging.

5 A Closing Caveat

My focus in this paper has been on Spinoza’s place in Anglo-American philosophy in the twentieth century. I have spoken mainly of work done in Great Britain and in North America, with occasional mention of Australia or New Zealand. Before closing I want to emphasize that I have not been addressing the subject of English-language Spinoza scholarship. If I had, the mix of topics would have been richer and the roster of important scholars much more extensive.

For one thing, the long arm of the British Empire brought the English language not only to North America, Australia and New Zealand, but to Hong Kong, Nigeria, South Africa and the Indian Sub-Continent. Were I addressing English-language scholarship, my perspective would necessarily be less narrowly Euro-centric. As a single example, Spinoza is one of the European philosophers who seem most accessible to certain schools of Indian thought, so we find a number of books in this century written by scholars in the Indian tradition comparing the views of Spinoza and Sankara.44

Since the Second World War a number of geo-political, economic and technological factors have worked together to make English into the closest thing we have to a world-language. For that reason, when learned authors from relatively small language communities want to reach out to the larger scholarly world, they are increasingly likely to publish their works in English. In Spinoza studies we see that to be the case especially with regard to the Netherlands, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries. Authors from these countries have gifted the English-speaking Spinoza community with perceptive commentary and solid historical research. I think, for instance, of the series of sensitive and insightful articles by Herman De Dijn over the years. Or the historical work of Wim Klever, Wiep van Bunge and others. Jon Wetlesen has done much to clarify the structure of some central sections of the Ethics while suggesting that the Buddhist tradition has something to

44 For example, M. S. Modak, Spinoza and the Upanishads: A Comparative Study (Nagpur: Nagpur Vidyapeeth Mudranalaya, 1970) and A. N. Bhattacharya, The Idealistic Philosophy of Sankara and Spinoza (Delhi: Durga Publications, 1985).
teach us about the experiential basis of the life of the Spinozistic sage. Arne Naess has stirred up a lively debate in the English-speaking world with his efforts to find in Spinoza an underpinning for the “deep ecology” movement. And beyond the bounds of Northern Europe we find Israeli scholars, especially Yirmiahu Yovel, contributing in a major way to the English-language literature on Spinoza.

I have tried to restrict my focus, for most of the paper, to the Anglo-American tradition rather than the more widely encompassing English-language community. It is still possible to maintain this distinction at the moment, but I think that very soon it will seem quite artificial and soon thereafter obsolete. The English-language writings of Continental scholars are widely read in Britain and North America, and Curley and Popkin would be entirely comfortable participants at meetings of the Vereniging. Indeed, each international conference and each volume of Studia Spinozana remind us that ultimately the community of Spinoza scholars is a single international community, limited neither by language nor by geographical boundary.

References


