Reply to Nadler: Spinoza’s Free Person and Wise Person Reconsidered

Abstract

This article addresses Steven Nadler’s response to my objections to his reading of Spinoza’s free person (homo liber). Nadler argues that there are no clear and significant differences between the free person and the wise person (vir sapiens) in their character or in the role they play in Spinoza’s moral philosophy; in fact, they are one and the same. I begin by critically examining three inferences which Nadler’s reading in part relies on. I then address the differences between the contexts in which Spinoza explicitly invokes the free person and the wise person. I argue that even though there may not be significant differences between the free person and the wise person in terms of their character and comportment, there is still reason to think that the free person plays a particular role in Spinoza’s moral philosophy—one which does not hinge on the attainment of the cognitive and affective excellence represented by the wise person at the end of the Ethics.