Spinoza’s Dual Pleasure Problem

Abstract

This paper offers a comprehensive outline of Spinoza’s account of pleasure or joy (laetitia). On the one hand, Spinoza defines pleasure as an increase in perfection qua self-affirmative power (E3defaff2). On the other hand, Spinoza describes blessedness (beatitudo), the highest happiness (summa felicitas), as both a form of pleasure (E5p36s/G II 303) and perfection qua self-affirmative power itself (E5p33s/G II 301). It is however unclear how a pleasure can be both an increase in perfection and perfection per se. This deviation from his original definition of pleasure has led many scholars to conclude that Spinoza is committed to a dual account of pleasure, with some pleasures being transitional and others non-transitional in nature. But on what philosophical grounds can Spinoza expand his account of pleasure to include non-transitional pleasure qua perfection per se? What underlying essence do increases in perfection and perfection per se share that classifies them both as pleasures? Ultimately, I will argue that an increase in perfection and blessedness as a state of perfection in itself can both be considered pleasures (albeit of different kinds) insofar as Spinoza understands pleasure fundamentally as an attribute-neutral affection (affectio) which expresses the promotion of self-affirmative power. This dual account of pleasure is grounded in an important distinction between the force of existing (existendi vim) and non-transitional pleasure possessed by both God qua substance and individuals qua finite modes of substance and the striving (conatus) and affects (affectus) that are possessed by only individuals as beings with limitations and fluctuating power.