Cartesian Ontology of Thought: Distinguishing Intellect and Will
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21827/jss.4.2.42574Keywords:
Descartes, Spinoza, intellect, will, conceptual distinctionAbstract
On the standard reading, Descartes maintains that there is a modal distinction between the two main faculties of the mind: intellect and will. Against the standard view, Alan Nelson has argued that a conceptual distinction holds between the intellect and the will, which entails that the intellect and will are ontologically identical, but two different ways of conceiving of mental substance. While there are interpretive benefits to such a view, it is also a highly revisionary reading of Descartes’ ontology of thought that threatens canonical features of Descartes’ philosophical system. I raise three objections to this reading
that must addressed in order for the conceptual reading to be viable.
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Copyright (c) 2025 Saja Parvizian
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