The Others in Spinoza’s Philosophy: Imitation, Utility, and Friendship

Abstract

The aim of this article is to investigate three aspects under which the figure of the “other” appears in Spinoza’s philosophy. First, I analyze the other as similar, which arises from the imitation of the affections, a mechanism of reproduction of the affections of our peers. This produces a break in the passions that aim at self-preservation, in order to incorporate the intersubjective dimension in one’s own affectivity. Second, I examine the other as useful, which emerges from the rational understanding that another human being living according to the guidance of reason is most beneficial for one’s own self-preservation. The drive for self-preservation leads to uniting with others because this results in an increase of one’s own power to exist, of one’s own conatus. Finally, I analyze Spinoza’s conception of friendship to emphasize that it arises from the active desire to do good to others as an expression of the fact that no human being undertakes their ethical path to freedom and happiness alone. This exploration of the different figures of others makes it possible, on the one hand, to reject interpretations that consider Spinoza’s philosophy as just another expression of modern individualism and ethical egoism. On the other hand, it provides an element to sustain that the subject of Spinozian ethics is not isolated human beings, but always a collective subject.