Is There a Spinozist Concept of Recognition?

Abstract

Among modern pre-Hegelian philosophers, the term recognition does not designate recognition in the Hegelian sense of the value of freedom, but the “gratitude” felt for a gift or service rendered that requires reciprocity. “Recognition” is generally expressed among them by the terms of esteem, honor, approval, consideration, respect, praise, or glorification and under these conditions, there is no phenomenon of arbitrary historical projection when one speaks of recognition in their regard, as has already been shown for a significant number of classical philosophers. In this respect, it is possible to argue that there is a Spinozist concept of recognition which, as with all theorists of recognition, presents an asymmetrical and conflictual aspect, as well as an aspect based on reciprocity. The first stems from an analysis of passive affects carried out in Part Three of the Ethics and is based on the principle of imitatio affectus. The second, instead of primarily valuing free will, emphasizes, in Parts Four and Five, the value of reciprocal self-realization based on shared rational knowledge.